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GOVERNMENT CONSENT TO WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
UNDER RULE 23(a) OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
THE Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees defendants
in federal criminal proceedings the right to trial by an impartial jury.' This
right is one of many by which the Constitution attempts to insure a fair crimi-
nal trial in federal courts. 2 By case law or statute an accused may elect to
waive most of these rights.3 Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 4 permits an accused to waive the right to jury trial and to elect
*United States v. Silverman, Crim. No. 91.11, D. Conn., March 29, 1956.
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed. . . ." U.S. CoxsT. amend. VI. Article III, § 2, cl. 3 also provides for jury
trial in all criminal cases except impeachment. These clauses are to be construed in pari
materia, Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1888), and are not jurisdictional, Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930).
The right to trial by jury of the Federal Constitution does not extend to state proceed-
ings. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461 (1942). Nor does it apply to petty offenses. Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937). On the scope and application
of the Sixth Amendment generally, see HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 35-59 (1951).
2. These rights are particularly set out in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276, 279 (1942) ; cf. Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227,236-37 (1940).
3. Case Law: Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1905) (double jeopardy);
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931) (self incrimination); Morland v.
United States, 193 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1951) (speedy trial) ; United States v. Sor-
rentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949) (public trial);
Grove v. United States, 3 F.2d 965, 966-67 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 691 (1925)
(confrontation of witnesses) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (assistance of
counsel).
Statute: FED. R. Cxms. P. 7(b) (grand jury indictment), United States v. Jones, 177
F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1949) ; FED. R. CPam. P. 20 (venue), United States v. Gallagher,
183 F.2d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 913 (1951), but see United States
v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603 (D. Ore. 1947). See also FED. R. CIam. P. 21 (a).
But the requirement of a unanimous verdict may not be waived. Hibdon v. United
States, 204 F.2d 834, 836-38 (6th Cir. 1953) (unanimous verdict considered element of due
process) ; see FED. R. Cram. P. 31(a). See generally Levine v. United States, 182 F.2d
556, 558-59 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 921 (1951).
4. "Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a
jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the government."
FED. R. CRIm. P. 23 (a).
The rules were authorized by 54 STAT. 688 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1952)
and became effective on March 21, 1946. They have the force and effect of statutes. Rattley
v. Irelan, 197 F.2d 585, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Ochoa v. United States, 167 F.2d 341, 345
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trial by the court aloneYr But the rule requires court approval and government
consent before waiver is permitted. Ordinarily government consent to waiver
may be obtained as a matter of course, and until recently this feature of rule
23(a) had not met with challenge. However, the possibility of hostile juries
in Smith Act 6 prosecutions suggests that the requirement of government con-
sent may clash with the basic purpose of the Sixth Amendment.
The constitutionality of the requirement of government consent to waiver
was attacked in the recent case of United States v. Silverman.$ Defendants
were indicted under the Smith Act for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow
of the government by force and violence. Before trial, they moved to waive a
jury and sought trial by the court.8 The government refused consent to the
waiver.0 In support of the motion the defendants contended, in effect, that an
accused has an unqualified right to waive a jury and that rule 23(a), by re-
stricting that right, is therefore unconstitutional on its face.' 0 The defendants
further maintained that in their case an impartial jury was unobtainable. l An
implicit premise of this argument was that the impartial jury requirement of
the Sixth Amendment would be defeated if the government could withhold,
consent to waiver.12 The government's refusal was based on a literal reading
(9th Cir. 1948). Promulgation by the Supreme Court did not foreclose consideration of
their validity. Cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946)
(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) ; Baker v. United States, 139 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir.
1944).
5. Federal trial courts are empowered to try criminal cases without a jury. See Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) ; Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 71 (1904).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
7. Crim. No. 9111, D. Conn., March 29, 1956, notice of appeal filed, 2d Cir., April 20,
1956. This is apparently the first case in which the rule's requirement of government con-
sent to waiver has been challenged. Subsequent to the motion for waiver of jury trial in
Silverman, a similar motion was made by defendants in another Smith Act case, United
States v. Brandt, Crim. No. 21276, N.D. Ohio, Feb. 10, 1956. Upon government refusal to
consent, the court orally denied defendants' motion for waiver stating that rule 23(a) was
constitutional. Letter from Hon. Charles J. McNamee, United States District Judge, N.D.
Ohio, April 11, 1956, and letter from Fred H. Mandel, attorney for defendants in Brandt,
April 12, 1956, to the Yale Law Journal, on file in Yale Law Library. See Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Feb. 11, 1956, p. 1, col. 3.
8. The motion was filed on Sept. 22, 1955. Memorandum of Decision on Defendants'
Motion for Waiver of Jury Trial, p. 1,-Oct. 3, 1955, United States v. Silverman (herein-
after cited as Silverman Memorandum).
9. Silverman Memorandum, p. 2; Transcript of Proceedings held on Sept. 30, 1955, in
Connection with Defendants' Motion to Waive Right to Trial by Jury, pp. 25-26, 28-29,
United States v. Silverman (hereinafter cited as Transcript) ; Brief for United States on
Question of Defendants' Motion for Waiver of Jury Trial, United States v. Silverman.
10. Silverman Memorandum, p. 1; Defendants' Brief on Motion to Waive Trial by
Jury, pp. 3-4, United States v. Silverman (hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief) ; Tran-
script, pp. 12, 22,23.
11. Silverman Memorandum, p. 1; Defendants' Brief, p. 4; Transcript, pp. 13-14, 19-21.
12. The defendants actually argued that the inability to obtain an impartial jury would
prevent a fair trial, thus denying due process under the Fifth Amendment. Defendants'
Brief, p. 4. This Note discusses this problem as a possible violation of the impartial jury
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of rule 23(a), which it urged allowed consent to be arbitrarily withheld.'3
The court denied the defendants' motion.' 4 Although recognizing that argu-
ments existed for allowing an accused alone to determine the mode of trial,
the court stated that rule 23(a) had the force of a statute and that it uncon-
ditionally required government consent.15 The court also held that the rule was
not unconstitutional, but it did not discuss the constitutional arguments raised
by the defendants.
The defendants' argument that they had an unqualified right to waive a jury
is unsupported either by case law or by logical analysis of the constitutional
right to jury trial. The defendants incorrectly relied on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Patton v. United States 16 for judicial authority that an unqualified
right of waiver exists. In Patton the Court held that an accused could be tried
by a jury of eleven when government and defense, with court approval, agreed
that the trial should continue after a juror became ill.'7 The Court clearly
indicated that waiver of trial by twelve jurors was equivalent to waiver of a
jury entirely.' 8 Patton, however, did not decide whether a defendant has an
unqualified right to waive a jury. Admittedly, language in the opinion declares
that the decision to waive a jury should rest entirely with an accused. 19 But
nothing in the decision supports the existence of an accused's right to be the
provision of the Sixth Amendment. Denial of this Sixth Amendment guarantee is also a
denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment. See Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779,
781 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942).
13. See note 9 supra.
14. Silverman Memorandum, pp. 2-3. Following denial of the motion for waiver, the
defendants brought a civil action against the trial judge and the United States District
Attorney. They sought an injunction to prevent trial by jury and requested the convening
of a three judge court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1952) to determine
the constitutionality of rule 23 (a). A government motion for dismissal was granted on the
ground that the constitutional question could be determined in the criminal action itself.
Memorandum of Decision on Motion to Dismiss, Silverman v. ,Cohen, Civil No. 5783, D.
Conn., Oct. 14, 1955. Trial of the original action before a jury began on Nov. 3, 1955. On
March 29, 1956, the jury found six defendants guilty, one not guilty, and was unable to
reach a verdict on the eighth. New Haven Evening Register, Nov. 3, 1955, p. 1, col. 1 and
March 30, 1956, p. 1, col. 2.
15. Silverman Memorandum, pp. 2-3.
16. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
17. Id. at 312-13. See Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 868 (1948) (jury of ten) ; Taylor v. United States, 142 F.2d 808, 816
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 723 (1.944) (jury of eleven). FED. R. CIMu. P. 23(b)
(parties may stipulate with court approval that jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve).
For history of jury waiver in federal courts up to Patton, see Grant, Waiver of Jlfry
Trials in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. R~v. 132, 147-56 (1932).
18. 281 U.S. at 290. Hence trial by jury has been permitted to be waived with govern-
ment consent and court approval. Spann v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Ferracane
v. United States, 47 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1931).
19. The provisions for jury trial were "meant to confer a right upon the accused which
he may forego at his election. To deny his power to do so, is to convert a privilege into an
imperative requirement." 281 U.S. at 298. See also id. at 296, 305, 308.
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sole judge of the mode of trial. On the contrary, a dictum states that govern-
ment consent is needed for waiver.20 This dictum has been followed by lower
federal courts to reject the existence of an unqualified right of an accused to
waiver 21 and in fact was the basis for rule 23 (a) .22
Nor does the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial establish the existence of
a defendant's unqualified right to waive a jury. The right to jury trial means
only that a defendant has a privilege not to be subjected against his will to
another form of trial. It does not mean he has a right to choose that different
form.2 3 True, federal courts have allowed defendants to waive rights similar
to the right of trial by jury.24 But in none of these instances was the decision
based on any constitutional right of waiver.
While rule 23(a) is not unconstitutional on its face, a reading of the rule
which makes government consent mandatory may violate the Sixth Amend-
nient guarantee of an impartial jury by forcing a Smith Act defendant to trial
before a biased jury when he has sought trial by the court. Three devices to
counter bias 25 in the jury are available to an accused who believes an im-
partial jury is unobtainable in the district of trial because considerable ani-
mosity has been manifested against him. He may request a change of venue,
ask for a continuance, 26 or accept trial in the district and rely on the voir dire
20. "In affirming the power of the defendant ... to waive a trial by . . . jury ... we
do not mean to hold that the waiver must be put into effect at all events.... Not only
must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously preserved, but
the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of such importance
and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the
consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the
express and intelligent consent of the defendant." 281 U.S. at 312.
21. C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85, 91-92 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Rees v. United
States, 95 F.2d 784, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1938) ; United States v. Dubrin, 93 F.2d 499, 505 (2d
Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 646 (1938).
22. See advisory committee note to rule 23(a) and Longsdorf, The Beginnings of
Fcdcral Criminal Procedure 44, in 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1951).
23. See Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 669, 25 S.E.2d 295, 301 (1943) ; People v. Scor-
navache, 347 I1. 403, 414-16, 179 N.E. 909, 913-14 (1931) ; Commonwealth v. Miller, 289
Mass. 441, 465, 194 N.E. 463, 474-75, cert. denied, 295 U.S. 765 (1935). But see People
v. Scornavache, supra at 420-21, 179 N.E. at 915 (dissenting opinion).
24. Seenote 3 supra.
25. "Bias" and "prejudice" are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v.
Valcnti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 83-87 (D.N.J. 1954) ; Stevens v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 216, 221-
25, 232 P.2d 949, 955-59 (1951) ; Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 584-87, 188 S.W.2d 555,
558-59 (1945) ; Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 20, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948). But see
THomsnsozi & MERRIAwt, JURIEs § 191 (1882). In this Note both terms are employed to
mean a hostility toward one of the parties that produces a "predisposition to decide a cause
or issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction."
BLACK, LAW DICrIONARY 205, 1343 (4th ed. 1951). See BuscH, LAW AND TActics IN
JfvR TRIALS § 117 (1949) ; 1 THO PsON, TRIALS § 72 (Early ed. 1912).
26. FED. R. CRIu. P. 21 (a) provides for change of venue on defendant's motion if the
court is satisfied that prejudice against the defendant precludes a fair and impartial trial in
the district. See United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512, 518-20 (S.D. Tex. 1955) (hostile
publicity); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (same). But trial
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to eliminate prejudiced jurors. Change of venue is practicable only if hostility
against an accused will be reduced by removal of trial to another district. And
continuance is effective only if it may be expected that bias against an accused
will subside in a reasonable time.2 7  In Smith Act prosecutions, however,
change of venue and continuance are ineffective to assure an impartial jury.
Courts have recognized that nationwide hostility exists against persons in-
dicted under the act.2 8 Extensive evidence corroborates this view.2 0 And no
courts are reluctant to grant a motion for transfer, and the determination is within their
sound discretion. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 225 F.2d 123, 128-29 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955) ; Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 177 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862 (1955).
While the federal rules do not specifically provide for continuance, courts will postpone
trials because of prejudicial publicity. See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 111-16
(1st Cir. 1952), 53 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1953). However, courts are also reluctant to
grant a continuance, the denial of which is within their sound discretion. Compare Delaney
v. United States, supra, with Schino v. United States, 209 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954) ; see Brown v. United States, 228 F.2d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 1955).
27. Courts will not postpone trials indefinitely. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 4
F.2d 688, 698 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 597 (1925) (cause for continuance
"would have doubtless been as impressive at a later date as it was at the time of the trial") ;
cf. United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 769
(1943) (refusal to postpone trial until after war). See note 30 infra.
28. E.g., "[I]t is urged that it was impossible ... to get an impartial jury because of
the heated public feeling against Communists. That such feeling did exist among many
persons-probably a large majority-is indeed true.. . " United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 226 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d
354, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955) ; United States v. Mesarosh,
223 P.2d 449, 457-58, 459-60 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 922 (1955).
Admittedly the hostility is against Communists. But Smith Act defendants are popularly
identified as Communists, and no defendant in a Smith Act trial since 1949 has testified he
was not a member of the Communist Party. Letter from William F. Tompkins, Assistant
Attorney General, United States Dep't of Justice, to the Yale Law Journal, March 23, 1956,
on file in Yale Law Library. Consequently the public hostility against Communists extends
to Smith Act defendants. While it might be argued that such community hostility has
greatly diminished during the past year, there is little indication that this is true. See, e.g.,
recent statement of United States Attorney General Brownell that the Communist "con-
spiracy is conducting business as usual, if not on an intensified scale." Time, April 30, 1956,
p. 20. Nor has the "Spirit of Geneva" been such that there no longer exists a "clear and
present danger." United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861, 870 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
350 U.S. 992 (1956) ("the smiles have been replaced with scowls").
29. See, e.g., federal legislation: Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 STAT.
987, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952) ; Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 775, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 841-42 (Supp. II, 1955) ; state statutes oitlawing the Communist Party: IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 10-5201 to -5209 (Burns Supp. 1953) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 264, §§ 16-23 (Supp.
1955) ; TLc. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6899-3A (Vernon Supp. 1955); e.xcluding Corn-
munists from public office: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.361-.362 (West Supp. 1954) ; DIGEST
OF TIE PUBLIC REcoRD OF COMIUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 324-82, 427-30 (1955)
(hereinafter cited as DIGEST OF COMMalUNISM) ; requiring non-Communist oaths: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 36.1-.2 (West Supp. 1955) ; DIGEST OF COMMUNISm 431-34, 472-87;
loyalty investigations: BONTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SE uRITY PROGRAM (1953) and
others of this series of Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty. See STOUFFER, COMMUNISM1, CON-
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indication exists that this hostility will diminish in the foreseeable future. 30
The voir dire is thus the only device open to Smith Act defendants for assur-
ing the selection of impartial jurors.
The voir dire examination has been considered an effective means of elimi-
nating biased jurors,31 but where widespread community hostility exists against
an accused, as in Smith Act cases, its value may be seriously impaired. The
Supreme Court has consistently indicated that the right of an accused to an
impartial jury is sufficiently protected by the opportunity voir dire affords to
disclose a prospective juror's bias.32 However, it is doubtful whether the voir
dire can effectively eliminate all biased veniremen. The voir dire operates as
an exclusionary device,33 permitting each venireman to be questioned to deter-
mine "actual bias." 34 Thus its ultimate effectiveness depends on the degree to
which questions asked will uncover bias. But a person aware of a prejudice
will not readily admit to it under public questioning.35 And if his bias is un-
conscious, it may be even more difficult to detect.30 Assuming a given effec-
FORMITY, AND CivIL LiBERTxs 39-48, 75-76, 156-87 (1955) ; MAclvER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM
In OUR TIME 34-44, 158-201, 312-15 (1955) ; BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE COMMUNIST PROBLEM
IN THE UNITED STATES (1955).
For evidence in Smith Act cases of the climate of opinion adverse to Communists, see,
e.g., Appellants' Brief in Support of Challenge and Other Questions, pp. 63-96, United
States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954).
30. See, e.g., Wellman v. United States, 227 F.2d 757, 775 (6th Cir. 1955) (anti-Com-
munist hostility not a temporary prejudice which could reasonably be expected to fade over
a period of time) ; United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 909 (1955) ; United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 226 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
31. See, e.g., Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) ; Scales v. United
States, 27 F.2d 581, 592 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 992 (1956) ; State v. Hume,
146 fe. 129, 133-34, 78 A-2d 496, 499-500 (1951) ; Kitts v. State, 153 Neb. 784, 792-93, 46
N.W.2d 158, 163-64 (1951).
The discussion of the voir dire in this Note is limited to challenge for cause for bias,
a determination within the sound discretion of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1952). On
challenges generally, see Buscn, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 67-154.
32. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950) ; Frazier v. United
States, 335 U.S. 497, 509-11 (1948) ; United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1936) ;
cf. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("Jury competence is an individ-
ual rather than a group or class matter.").
33. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887) ; BuscH, op. cit. supra note 25,
§ 72; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 638, 639 (1949).
34. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950).
35. Id. at 175-85 (dissenting opinions) ; BuscH, op. cit. supra note 25, § 141; GOLD-
STE , TRIAL TECHmqUE § 236 (1935) ; Nizer, The Art of the Jury Trial, 32 CORNELL
L.Q. 59, 63 (1946). See also, Stevens v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 216, 221-25, 232 P.2d 949,
955-59 (1951) (on voir dire examination juror denied prejudice which he clearly had).
36. Cf. "[A]ny examination on the voir dire is a clumsy and imperfect way of detect-
ing suppressed emotional commitments to which all of us are to some extent subject, un-
consciously or subconsciously .... If trial by jury is not to break down by its own weight,
it is not feasible to probe more than the upper levels of a juror's mind." United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 227 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See Note, The Right
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tiveness for the voir dire, the number of biased jurors chosen should increase
in direct proportion to the percentage of biased veniremen on the panel. When
only a minor percentage of the jury panel is biased, which is probably most
often true, at most only a few biased jurors will be chosen because the usual
effectiveness of the voir dire will eliminate a large portion of the biased panel
members. When a large percentage, perhaps a majority, of the panel is biased
against an accused because of widespread community hostility against him, the
number of biased veniremen who become jurors will probably be significantly
greater than in the usual criminal case. The existence of such hostility is the
norm in Smith Act cases.8 7 It may thus be argued that defendants in these
cases will be tried by juries with a substantial number of biased members un-
less they waive jury trial.3 8 Under these circumstances if the government can
force jury trial on a defendant by arbitrarily withholding consent to waiver,
the impartial jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment would be violated.39
to an Impartial Federal Jury in the Event of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 651, 659 (1953).
Moreover, questioning on the voir dire is limited, another factor reducing its effective-
ness to disclose bias. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) the trial judge may examine the panel
himself. Though counsel may suggest questions, the court's discretion in accepting them is
usually controlling. See, e.g., Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1956) ;
Cwach v. United States, 212 F.2d 520, 531-32 (8th Cir. 1954). And courts will not always
allow extended interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. lesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345, 349
(W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 922 (1955). In-
formal questioning of veniremen by counsel in the judge's chambers might prove more
satisfactory than formal court room examination. This procedure was recently used in a
Smith Act case in the Southern District of New York. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1956, p. 27,
col. 3.
37. See notes 28,29 supra.
38. "Since ... challenges ... are merely rejection devices, their success must depend,
in the last analysis, on the existence of a panel containing a high proportion of unprejudiced
prospective jurors." Note, Selection of Jurors by Voir Dire Examination and Challenge,
58 YALE L.J. 638, 639 (1949). See also Note, Fair Trial and Biased Public Opinion, 3
SYRAcusE L. Ray. 150, 151, 153, 156 (1951).
The argument that Smith Act defendants are unable to secure impartial juries may be
somewhat vitiated by recent acquittals. In United States v. Brandt, Crim. No. 21276, N.D.
Ohio, Feb. 10, 1956, the jury acquitted four of the eleven defendants and a fifth was ac-
quitted by directed verdict. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 11, 1956, p. 1, col. 3. Of the eight
defendants in Silverman, the jury acquitted one and reached no verdict on another. See
note 14 supra. However, of the 113 defendants tried by jury in "Communist" Smith Act
cases up to April 1, 1956, 103 have been convicted, six acquitted, three acquitted by di-
rected verdict, and no verdict reached on one. Enclosure No. 130162 to letter from William
F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General, United States Dep't of Justice, to the Yale Law
Journal, March 23, 1956, on file in Yale Law Library; N.Y. Times, March 30, 1956, p. 19,
col. 1.
39. The requirement of government consent under rule 23(a) foreshadows possible
unfairness in other cases, for community passions can operate similarly to the disadvantage
of any unpopular defendant. Cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (dissenting
opinion) ("in spite of forms they [juries] are extremely likely to be impregnated by the
environing atmosphere"). See also JOUGHIN & MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VAN-
znrv 191-97 (1948) ; Grant, Felony Trials Without a Jury, 25 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 980,
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The Second Circuit's opinion in Dennis v. United States,40 the first Com-
munist trial under the Smith Act,41 does not necessitate a contrary conclusion.
In Dennis the court held that a Smith Act defendant must be brought to trial
even in the face of "heated public feeling against Communists" which might
produce a biased jury. The court declared that a jury meets the standard of
the Sixth Amendment if the best means available to secure an impartial jury
have been used.4 2 Thus under the Dennis rationale the amendment guarantees
a defendant an unbiased jury, but if such a jury is unavailable the most im-
partial jury obtainable will suffice. Since the defendants in the Dennis case
did not seek to waive a jury, the alternative to jury trial was to allow the
prosecution to lapse, an unacceptable solution.43 It was therefore necessary
for the Dennis court to reach the conclusion it did.44 In Silverman, on the
other hand, by waiver of a jury the defendants invoked the frequently em-
ployed alternative of trial by the court .4  The waiver consequently avoided the
conclusion forced upon the Dennis court. It directly presented for decision the
991-92, 994 (1931); Comments, 14 Mo. L. REv. 185, 189 (1949), 23 ROCKY Mr. L. REv.
334, 335 (1951.).
40. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
41. Prior to the trial of "first string" Communists in Dennis, there were only two
prosecutions under the Smith Act: Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943) (conviction of Socialist Workers Party members) ; United
States v. Larremore (S.D. Cal. 1941) (unreported). Letter from William F. Tompkins,
Assistant Attorney General, United States Dep't of Justice, to the Yale Law Jcornal, March
23, 1956, on file in Yale Law Library. For discussion of the Smith Act and prosecutions
thereunder, see DIGEST OF CoMMuisMr 194-205; Note, 31 IND. L.J. 104 (1955).
42. 183 F.2d at 226.
43. Ibid. Cf. "[TIhis danger [of hostility toward Communists] is one of the risks run
in a trial by jury; and the defendants made no effort to procure a trial by judge alone,
under Criminal Rule 23(a)." United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 596 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
44. The court's ruling was justified by a doctrine of necessity which has been applied
in analogous situations. Hearings before administrative bodies have been upheld in the face
of a party's charge of bias if no other agency was provided by statute to decide a case.
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 420-21 (1941) ; Marquette Cement Mfg.
Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1-948);
Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936). But a hearing before a biased agency
violates due process if an alternative tribunal is available. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phelps, 136
F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943).
And necessity has permitted proceedings before courts charged with bias if no other
tribunal was available. See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1920) ; State 'ex rel.
Gardner v. Holm, 241 Minn. 125, 126, 62 N.W.2d 52, 54 (1954). See Annot., 39 A.L.R.
1476 (1925).
45. Waiver is common in the federal courts. During the 1955 fiscal year, for example,
of 4087 criminal trials in federal courts, 1349 were court trials. Letter from Will Shafroth,
Chief, Div. of Procedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, to the Yale Law Jourzal, Oct. 28, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. See also
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN, TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 46 (1954) ; JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FIrTH ANNUAL REPORT 174-78 (1939) (hereinafter
cited as N.Y. REPORT).
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issue of the jury's bias and the constitutionality of the government's arbitrary
withholding of consent under rule 23(a).
The court in Silverman should therefore have explicitly decided whether
an impartial jury was obtainable, for under the court's interpretation of the
rule this finding was necessary to determine its constitutionality in the case.
The court made no such finding; presumably, in accord with Dennis, it con-
sidered that the jury would be sufficiently impartial as long as it were chosen
by the best means available. However, after the Silverman defendants moved
for court trial, the real issue was whether an unbiased jury was obtainable at
all. A finding that any jury would probably be biased would have required
granting the defendants' motion for waiver,46 for denial of waiver under these
circumstances would also deny the right to an impartial jury. Consequently,
the court's view that rule 23(a) allows the government to withhold consent
arbitrarily would have made the rule unconstitutional in Silverman had the
jury bias issue been decided in favor of the defendants.
Rule 23(a) could have been interpreted to allow government consent to be
only reasonably withheld. This reading of the rule would save its constitu-
tionality in Silverman, for if the court determined the jury bias issue favorably
to the defendants government refusal to consent would be clearly unreason-
able. On the other hand, if the court decided differently on the bias question,
it would then evaluate the government's reasons for refusing consent. Admit-
tedly, cases dealing with the issue of a defendant's waiver of jury before rule
23(a) was promulgated allowed government consent to be arbitrarily with-
held. 47 And it could justifiably be argued that the rule was meant to follow
these decisions. But the Patton opinion, from which the rule is derived, does
not compel this interpretation. Along with the dictum declaring the need for
government consent to waiver, Patton stated that the decision on waiver should
rest with an accused. 48 Moreover, when the Supreme Court later cited the
dictum approvingly, it also reiterated the view of Patton that the defendant
should be permitted to determine the form of trial.49 In adopting rule 23(a),
therefore, the Court might have intended to empower the government to pre-
vent waiver of jury only where it gave reasonable grounds for refusing con-
46. The court's finding on the jury's probable bias should be made prior to the voir
dire examination. Presumably the finding would be based on affidavits, direct testimony or
other evidence offered at a hearing on the issue. See, e.g., Delaney v. United States, 199
F.2d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 1952).
47. See cases cited note 21 supra.
48. See notes 19,20 sxpra.
49. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-80 (1942). Adams
indicates that trial by jury is a right which an accused should be able to waive at will:
"And since trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be permitted
to forego its privileges when his competent judgment counsels him that his interests are
safer in the keeping of the judge than the jury." Id. at 278; "[A]n accused, in the exercise
of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive
trial by jury." Id. at 275. Yet the Patton dictum requiring government consent was ac-
knowledged, id. at 277-78, and the government had consented to the waiver.
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sent. In addition, the government's arbitrary withholding of consent did not
pose a constitutional issue in any of the earlier cases. Until Silverman, there-
fore, no conflict with a constitutional right arose to invite a different reading
of the rule. But Silverman presented a situation in which the rule could
operate unconstitutionally if the interpretation that government consent is
mandatory were followed. The suggested interpretation would obviate this
possibility and would accord with the rule of statutory construction favoring
avoidance of constitutional issues where possible.5
An argument which the government might have employed for refusing con-
sent to waiver is that a "public interest" in trial by jury exists which must be
protected. This argument would carry no weight if the court upheld the de-
fendants' position on the jury's probable bias. The contention that the public
has an interest in conducting trials by jury rests on the theory that the jury
will protect an accused from unfounded conviction. 51 But when it is probable
that the jury will be biased against an accused, he would be harmed, not aided,
by jury trial. Assuming the court in Silverman decided against the defendants
on the bias issue, the public interest argument should still be rejected if the
court found that the defendants had intelligently waived the protection the jury
was meant to provide. A defendant's intelligent waiver weakens the public
interest argument. Such waiver reflects the defendant's considered decision
that the court would provide a fair trial. Furthermore, by allowing an accused
to plead guilty and thus reject a jury's protection entirely, federal criminal
law indicates that little weight is actually accorded to this ground for requir-
ing government consent. 2
Apart from the constitutional issue raised in Silverman, the decision whether
trial is to be by a jury or before the court should rest solely with an accused. 53
50. See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948) ; Anniston Mfg. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1937); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 574
(1931).
51. See, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) ("The public has an interest in
[an accused's] ... life and liberty.") ; State v. Ricks, 173 Kan. 660, 664, 250 P.2d 773, 777
(1952) ; Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 137-38 (1858).
52. In Patton the public interest argument was rejected as an unsound reason for re-
fusing waiver, 281 U.S. at 302-08, on the ground that defendant may dispense with a trial
altogether by a plea of guilty. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. But see Perkins, Proposed Jury
Changes in Criminal Cases, 16 IowA L. REv. 20, 22 (1931). For discussion and refutation
of the public interest theory, see Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases,
25 MICH. L. REv. 695, 710-17 (1927).
53. This is the conclusion of the American Law Institute. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 266 (1930). Various commentators have stated that consent of court and
government should not be required. See, e.g., ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST
TO APP.AL 393 (1947) ; N.Y. REPORT 166; Grant, Waiver of Jury Trials in. Felony Cases,
20 CALIF. L. REv. 132, 161 (1932) ; Oppenheim, supra note 52, at 736. See also Stewart,
Comments on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 JoIN MARSHALL L.Q. 296, 301
(1943).
Conceivably it could be argued that a statute permitting an accused to waive jury trial
at his discretion would be a legislative infringement on judicial power. But since the
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Rule 23(a) should be revised to eliminate entirely the need for government
consent to waiver and to require court approval only as assurance that waiver
has been intelligently made.54 Two arguments have been advanced to support
the present rule: the constitutional right of an accused to jury trial must be
jealously guarded, and the jury traditionally holds an important place in crimi-
nal law as a fact-finding bodyY5 Neither argument justifies a rule that allows
the government to prevent trial by the court. That the right of an accused to a
jury should be carefully guarded is axiomatic. But requiring a waiver which
the court believes to be intelligently made would sufficiently protect the defen-
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court, such an
objection probably would be obviated on the federal level. Nor does the "separation of
powers" argument have substantial merit in preventing such legislation by the states. See, for
example, the history of waiver in Illinois as reflected in the following cases: People cx rel.
Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N.E. 722 (1930) ; People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403,
179 N.E. 909 (1931) ; People v. Scott, 383 Ill. 122, 48 N.E.2d 530 (1943) ; People v. Spegal,
5 Ill. 2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955), 33 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (1955).
54. Some states allow waiver of jury by an accused without either government or
court consent. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 736 (1955), People v. Spegal, supra note
53, at 120-22, 125 N.E.2d at 472-73; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28:856 (1954), People v. Martin,
256 Mich. 33, 35, 239 N.W. 341 (1931); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.05-.06 (Page
1954), State v. Smith, 123 Ohio St. 237, 240-41, 246-48, 174 N.E. 768, 770-72 (1931) ; cf.
LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 15:342 (1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.01 (1947); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-27-3 (1953).
But both court approval and government consent to waiver are required by, e.g., IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-1803 (Burns 1942), State ex rel. Rose v. Hoffman, 227 Ind. 256, 262, 85
N.E.2d 486, 488 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-140 (1949), State v. Ricks, 173 Kan.
660, 664-65, 250 P.2d 773, 777 (1952) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 786 (Purdon Supp. 1954),
Commonwealth ex rel. Henderson v. Kruger, 119 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 1956) ; VA.
CODE ANN. § 19-166 (Supp. 1954) ; Wis. STAT. § 357.01 (1953).
Some states, while not requiring consent of the prosecutor, require court approval of
waiver. E.g., Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22(a), Mo. Sup. CT. (CRIM.) Ru.E 26.01(a), Com-
ment, 14 Mo. L. REv. 185 (1949) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.060 (1952).
Except to assure that defendant made an intelligent choice, knowing of his rights, sue
State v. Ellard, 95 N.H. 217, 222, 60 A.2d 461, 465 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 904
(1949) ; cf. Dillingham v. United States, 76 F.2d 36, 39 (1935) (conviction reversed be-
cause waiver made without full understanding of rights), there is little more reason to
require court approval than government consent to waiver. See commentaries cited note 53
supra. For discussion of jury waiver in state criminal cases, see BuscH, op. cit. supra note
25, §§ 46-47; Grant, Waiver of Jury Trials in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 132, 135-46
(1932) ; Oppenheim, supra note 52, at 699-733; Perkins, supra note 52, at 2249.
55. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). It has also been suggested
that the state has acquired a right to jury trial. See, e.g., People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill.
403, 416, 179 N.E. 909, 914 (1931) ("The long recognition by courts everywhere that trial
in a criminal case means a jury trial has clearly given to the people the right to object to
a trial by the court on waiver of a jury trial by the accused."), criticized in 27 ILL. L.
REv. 447 (1932). See also State v. Mead, 4 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1837) ; State cx rel. Gutierrez
v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 52 N.M. 28, 32-33, 191 P.2d 334, 337 (1948). For criticism and
rejection of this view, see Hall, Has the State a Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases?,
18 A.B.A.J. 226, 227 (1932). See also People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468
(1955), overruling Scornavache, supra.
[Vol. 651042
1956] NOTES 1043
dant. Furthermore, trial by jury was considered solely a defendant's safe-
guard against arbitrary government prosecution 57 when the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights were adopted. 8 No evidence exists that the government
56. See Grant, Felony Trials Without a Jury, 25 Am. POL. Scr. Rxv. 980, 994-95
(1931).
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the government may be relied upon to protect
a defendant's rights. While it is generally stated that the prosecuting attorney's function
is not to convict but to see that justice is done, see, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935), in practice the desire for a verdict of guilty may substantially weaken his
role on behalf of an accused. JOUGHIN & MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 39, at 185-89. Cf.
"It is ironk indeed, that... the tribunal which for centuries was regarded as the safeguard
and protection of the accused, can now . . . be employed by the State to facilitate convic-
tion." Hall, supra note 55, at 227.
57. Such was not always true, however. The modern jury evolved from inquests em-
ployed by Norman and Angevin kings to obtain information. HASKINS, NORMAN INSTI-
TUTIONS 196 (1918); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 74, 140-41 (2d
ed. 1899). The Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 EDW. 1, c. 12, indicates that jury trial was
not always beneficial to the accused. It provided that felons refusing to go to trial were to
be put into a "prison forte et dure," transformed in common speech to "peine forte et
dure." By the sixteenth century this phrase came to mean the form of torture whereby
prisoners were crushed until they accepted jury trial or died. PLUcKNET, A CONCISE HIS-
TORY OF THE COMMON LAW 121-22 (4th ed. 1948) ; 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRri-
NAL LAW OF ENGLAND 298-99 (1883). Not until Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), were jurors freed from fines and imprisonment for reaching a ver-
dict contrary to the court's instructions. On the history of jury trial generally, see 1 HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 298-347 (6th ed. 1938) ; PLUCxNT", op. cit. supra
at 104-30; THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TRATISE ON EVIDENCE 1-182 (1898).
Whatever the early history of the jury, by the eighteenth century it was considered an
important English right for the benefit of the accused. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES t379, *381 ("the glory of the English law", "this best preservative of English
liberty"); CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTY 22, 200-03 (5th ed. 1721); J[AcoB], THE LAws OF
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 31 (2d ed. 1734); [Somers], The Security of Englishmen's Lives,
in A GumE TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILESs OF ENGLISHMEN 148-52
(1757). See also MAITLAND, Outlines of English Legal History, 560-1600, in 2 COLLECTED
PAPERS 445 (1911).
58. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) ; Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-98 (1-930) ; People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 409-12, 179 N.E.
909, 911-12 (1931).
Trial by jury was clearly considered a benefit for the accused in the colonies. Trials in
vice-admiralty courts without juries, for example, caused colonials to protest they were
being deprived of an English liberty. 4 ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 224, 258, 263 n.1, 270 (1938). Various public documents voiced this objection.
See, e.g., 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 214, 378, 431 (Boyd ed. 1950). For dis-
cussion of jury trial in the colonies see HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 13-34 (1951).
Records indicate little discussion of jury trial at the constitutional convention. See 2
FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 144, 173, 187, 434, 438, 587,
628 (2d ed. 1937). But see, e.g., 3 id. at 101, 221. And the debates on the Bill of Rights
clearly indicate that trial by jury was for the benefit of the accused. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS 452-55, 458, 783-85, 788-89 (Gales ed. 1834); RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 passim (1955). See also 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1773-74 (1833).
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was meant to have a right or interest in jury trial. 59 The argument based on
the jury's role as a fact-finding body is equally unimpressive. The extensive
use of rule 23(a) itself indicates that the jury is no longer indispensable for
this purpose.60 The only objection to trial by the court without government
consent is the possible bias of the judge against the prosecution or for the
defendant. Protection is afforded against this possibility by the procedure for
disqualifying federal judges. 61
59. N.Y. REPORT 166; see authorities cited note 58 supra. But see note 55 supra.
60. See note 45 supra. Even before rule 23(a), trial by the court was used in some
federal districts. See, e.g., discussion of waiver in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in
Grant, Felony Trials Without a Jury, 25 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 980, 985-86 (1931). For
criticism of the jury as a fact finder, see Frank, COURTS ON TMAL 114-27 (1950) ; Broeder,
The Functions of the Jury, Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 387-401, 413-17
(1954).
The relative merits of jury and court trial have been much debated during the past cen-
tury. For a summary of the various arguments, see memorandum by Professor Harry
Kalven, Jr., University of Chicago Law School, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 63-81 (1955).
For lists of materials on juries, see HELL., op. cit. supra note 58, at 178-88; Hill, Selected
List of Materials on Juries, 4 THE RECORD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEw YORK 139 (1949). The debate has generally been in terms of jury trial in civil cases.
See FRANx, op. cit. supra at 145; Corbin, The Jury on Trial, 14 A.B.A.J. 507, 508 (1928).
But much of the criticism is equally applicable to juries in criminal trials. Broeder, supra
at 417.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1952) (disqualification for bias or prejudice). Relief under this
section is limited, for a party may file only one affidavit of bias or prejudice in any case.
And there is indication that the section is not very effective. Frank, Disqualification of
Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 629-30 (1947) ; Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Fed-
eral District Courts, 11 U. Prrr. L. REv. 415, 418-29 (1950). But the remedy is not to give
the government a power to insist on jury trial. Instead the disqualification procedure should
be strengthened.
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